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Chapter 1: Introduction 
North Korea’s nuclear program continues to be one of the highest priority foreign 
policy agenda items for the United States. A major motivation for putting together this 
research is the importance of this topic, as a growing North Korean nuclear regime and 
the potential for nuclear proliferation will ultimately translate into a more dangerous 
world. The primary purpose of this research is to extrapolate the reasons why the United 
States has employed a multilateral approach to addressing North Korea’s nuclear 
program and aggressive actions. Why has the United States chosen this approach? This 
research and conclusions will attempt to answer this key question and also take a careful 
look at the United States relationship with states in East Asia including North Korea, or 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). There will also be a prescriptive 
section, providing policy recommendations that attempt to address this critical foreign 
policy challenge. This research will include a literature review, which will take a close 
look at several current pieces of literature. Some of the literature delves into American 
ambivalence or the mixed messages the United States sends by certain actions. Other 
literature focuses on the nuclear program in North Korea and analyzes the history and 
possible future paths of North Korea. International relations theory will also be explored 
including the topics of realism, liberalism, balance of power and American 
exceptionalism. My research will present a clear analysis of American foreign policy 
with the DPRK, as well as highlight the American inclination to pursue ambivalent 
engagement.  
While the United States has generally employed this multilateral approach, there 




Therefore, I argue that while the United States is often ambivalent in its foreign policy, it 
has ultimately chosen a multilateral approach for dealing with North Korea and its 
nuclear weapons program. Some may argue that U.S. foreign policy principally yields to 
multilateral approaches and I would agree this is often the case. However, the United 
States at times remains sporadic in its foreign policy strategies and actions. I would argue 
that U.S. foreign policy in North Korea is a diversified approach, which involves a 
mixture of engagement such as unilateral, bilateral and multilateral. In today’s climate, 
the pendulum tends to swing most often to a multilateral approach. I believe the main 
reason for this mix of strategies is attributable to domestic and international 
considerations that I will explore in my research. With these varied types of engagement, 
I then argue that this leads to confusion on policy, which is ultimately unproductive. 
Policymakers seem to be split on how to approach North Korea. More conservative 
hardliners want the United States to take more unilateral action and the more liberal 
moderates generally favor the idea of a coalition working together to deal with the 
DPRK. It should be noted that some analysts remind us that multilateral efforts can 
actually weaken American attempts at diplomacy. “While multilateral diplomacy is 
indispensable, involving more governments – with varying motives, interests, and 
objectives – at best it complicates and worst dilutes or even undermines US efforts.”1 In a 
globalized world that seems to shrink daily, the United States acting bilaterally is not as 
common as multilateral engagement and unilateralism is even more uncommon. 








hear the other state’s side, essentially allowing a more direct discussion without other 
states giving their two cents. Furthermore, the essence of a bilateral relationship implies 
equal footing and status for the two states present and this is why some analysts state that 
one of North Korea’s main objectives is a bilateral relationship with the United States. 
I will evaluate U.S. foreign policy approaches in dealing with North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program, and identify contributing variables to the U.S.’s multilateral 
approach in this regard.  I shall argue that the use of multilateralism is the byproduct of 
liberalist theories or approaches. The United States is using multilateralism as a liberal 
means to reach its goals, and the U.S. sees multilateralism as the foreign policy tool that 
best serves its interests in this particular situation. Furthermore, I believe that the United 
States is exhibiting strategic restraint by investing in and advocating multilateral 
engagement, which contributes to stability in the region. The U.S. is illustrating its ability 
to work with other nations and be part of a grand strategy to curtail or stop North Korean 
aggression. In addition, the responsibility for peace and stability is shared among the 
states involved in the multilateral engagement and therefore, the risk is actually 
distributed among these states. A realist approach would advocate a military solution or 
perhaps the use of power or perceived threats to dictate policy and I believe the United 
States and its allies would not support such a tactic. In fact, a military solution or 
attempting to strong arm North Korea is perhaps the last thing the United States and its 
regional partners would want to do because of the possible escalation of hostilities on the 
peninsula. If anything, a realist approach risks the possibility of damaging the status and 
reputation of the United States and I believe this would translate into states moving away 




the tacit backing of South Korea is highly unlikely, but such a move would definitely be a 
point of contention between the two current close allies. Also, the Sino-American 
relationship is currently rather positive but China would strongly object any use of force 
against the DPRK without a serious justification. 
This research will be a qualitative study and there are several methodologies I 
plan to use. I analyze my argument about American ambivalence and my feeling that the 
United States has widely favored multilateralism in dealing with the DPRK using 
historical archives and interviews. Other sources include books, articles, and reports, 
including primary sources such as United Nations documents and speeches such as those 
from the United Nations Security Council, the United States Mission to the United 
Nations, Department of State reports as well as presidential State of the Union addresses. 
Some of the primary sources will be from those who have been part of United States 
policymaking and especially those who have also been deeply involved in the American 
relationship with North Korea.  
This research will explore the rationale for multilateralism, and most likely see it 
as a tool that helps to reassure other states and maintain them as allies. The U.S. wants 
these states to feel as though their opinions matter and to make certain they don’t feel 
intimidated if they choose to oppose American proposals. This research will also look at 
certain aspects of liberalism including a focus on international law, which has been 
utilized to inhibit North Korean behavior. The United Nations Security Council has 
employed legal action through sanctions imposed on North Korea to attempt to stall its 
nuclear program. Another element in the liberal realm is the role of an international 




Nations, the most prominent intergovernmental organization in the world, seek to work 
towards a peaceful resolution to the nuclear standoff and to end tensions on the Korean 
peninsula. The United States has dealt directly and frequently with each as a member and 
key player in both. The U.N. Security Council and the Six-Party talks are two examples 
of multilateral platforms that the U.S. utilizes to push for its foreign policy goals. Some 
goals include American and South Korean security on the peninsula and a focus on the 
denuclearization of North Korea. 
There are several questions to consider when looking at US foreign policy in 
North Korea including: 
 What unilateral action has the U.S. taken in North Korea, and has it been 
effective? 
 
 What bilateral action has the U.S. taken in North Korea, and has it been effective? 
 
 What multilateral action has the U.S. taken in North Korea, and has it been 
effective? 
 
 Has the overall American strategy/policy in North Korea been effective? Has it 
been confusing? 
 
 Is there evidence that the US prefers working alone, bilaterally or multilaterally? 
 
 What is the evidence that the United States has utilized multiple forms of 
engagement? 
 
 How much has changed from the administration of George W. Bush to the 
administration of Barack Obama? 
 
 Does multilateralism add to the leveraging to change North Korea’s behavior? 
 
 How has the United States used the United Nations to achieve its goals? 
 
 
There will also be several case studies in my research that take a closer look at 




when notable Americans have visited North Korea and highlight the visits to the DPRK 
by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former President Bill Clinton. I will 
look at the issue or concern that brought these specific high-level individuals to North 
Korea, what action if any was taken, and what ultimately was the outcome. One source 
will be former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s memoir in which she not only 
speaks of her time in the day-to-day operations of American governance but also delves 
into her experience visiting North Korea and personally meeting with the late Kim Jong 
Il.  
Some other primary sources that offer a window into US foreign policy include 
interviews that I have conducted with several individuals who have a wide breadth of 
experience in diplomacy and international relations. The interview subjects include Dr. 
Stephen Noerper, a specialist on North Korea who is currently the Senior Vice President 
at the Korea Society, Guillermo Rosa, a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel (retired) who was 
a Deputy Military Advisor to Ambassador Susan Rice at the U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations, and the third interviewee is Ana Escrogima, the current Diplomat in Residence 
at the City College of New York. All have graciously offered their valuable insight on 
diplomacy and the wisdom they have acquired through real world experience. Their 
assessments and revelations have added to both the quality and clarity of my research. 
The importance of the global challenge of a nuclear North Korea cannot be 
overstated. The United States, its partners, other states and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) have all attempted to stop North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons. “Thanks to the nonproliferation regime (under the auspices of the Nuclear 




ability to build nuclear arsenals, have renounced nuclear weapons.”2 Regrettably, over at 
least the last decade, the nuclear ambitions of North Korea have become more and more 
apparent while the attempts at stymying its acquisition of nuclear weapons have 
ultimately failed. If their acquisition of nuclear weapons is ultimately for global clout or 
purely defensive purposes, their goals remain unclear. Does the DPRK have more 
nefarious plans for its nuclear program such as proliferation or even a first strike 
scenario? Time will tell but the current world logic is to try and deescalate the current 
nuclear crisis. It seems that an aggressive North Korea only serves one nation well in the 
short run: North Korea. In the long run, this aggression further isolates North Korea while 
the other states in the region look on with worry and indignation at what seems like a 
never-ending litany of North Korean aggressive actions. As Lt. Col. Guillermo Rosa has 
stated, “China and Russia are not so different from us in many regards and they too are 
disturbed and perplexed by aggressive external and internal actions by the DPRK.”3 
North Korean action, whether a missile test or building a nuclear weapon, makes the 
whole region less stable and therefore less safe. Furthermore, if two of our strongest allies 
(South Korea and Japan) in the region feel unsafe and threatened, then the United States 
feels unsafe and threatened.4 The graph on the next page illustrates how in depth the 
nuclear program of North Korea is and provides a disturbing visual of a North Korea that 
has locations for both light-water and gas-graphite reactors, research and development 









locations for uranium enrichment. It also identifies the locations of explosive test sites 
and missile launch sites. The article with this graph also relates how North Korea 
amended its constitution professing itself a nuclear power by adding the term ‘nuclear 
armed state.’5 
Graph A –The Nuclear Realities of North Korea6 
 
																																																								
5	Watson, Leon. We ARE A Nuclear Power: North Korea’s Chilling Claim in New 	







“North Korea surprised the world with its first nuclear test on Oct. 9, 2006.”7From 
that moment, the region became perhaps the least stable it has been since the Korean 
War. The fact is that an aggressive and nuclear-armed North Korea gives pause to the 
entire region. As the diplomat Ana Escrogima has stated, “North Korea is obviously on 
the wrong side of history on this, and will only come to see the pressure that is going to 
be brought to bear at some point or another because the world is going in a different 
direction.”8 While the United States has been working diligently to secure a deal on the 
nuclear issue with Iran and both the United States and Russia have continued to scale 
back their nuclear arsenals, North Korea continues to pursue more nuclear weapons. 
Sanctions and isolation have put pressure on the regime. However, it is apparent that both 
have not stopped the DPRK from not only going nuclear but also continuing to act 






















Graph B – A Snapshot of Provocation on the Peninsula - 2010-20139 
 
 
The graph on provocation is a snapshot of these inflammatory actions and it aptly 
illustrates some of the serious challenges caused by North Korea. It is evident that over a 
selected four-year window, the DPRK has perpetrated multiple confrontational actions. 
During this period, the DPRK committed some of the most alarming actions, including 
the sinking of a South Korean naval ship (the Cheonan) and “the first shelling of South 
Korean territory since the end of the Korean War.”10  
In speaking with a military expert who was at the United States Mission to the 
United Nations at the time, “the North Koreans took a huge risk in sinking the 
Cheonan.”11 This could be considered an act of war but the ramifications of a conflict 










itself or, if necessary, destroying the north – they are less well prepared to respond to the 
North’s pinpricks.”12 While the sinking of a naval ship with nearly 50 soldiers killed is a 
tragic and barbaric attack, South Korea along with the US and its allies ultimately 
decided that a full retaliatory response was not warranted because of the possible 
runaway escalation that might occur between the two nations. The graph includes other 
provocative actions by the DPRK including launching satellites, restarting a nuclear 
reactor, denying entry to South Koreans at the joint South Korean/North Korean 
industrial park at Kaesong and conducting its third nuclear test on February 12, 2012. 
There are some other aspects of this graph that should be highlighted, including the Leap 
Day Agreement, which the DPRK ultimately violated, resulting in a unanimous 
tightening of sanctions by the United Nations. 
To reiterate, my research will include a thorough literature review and take a 
closer look at one-on-one or bilateral engagement through several case studies. It will 
also explore multilateral engagement and highlight the significance of China’s role in the 
equation as well as the Six-Party talks and the United Nations, more specifically the UN 
Security Council. My research will also focus on the ambivalence of the United States in 
its foreign policy with North Korea and analyze my argument about this ambiguity to see 
if it is supported. In the end, I believe that U.S. foreign policy in the DPRK is 
overwhelmingly multilateral, utilizing a diverse strategy to deal with this critical foreign 








on its repeated ambiguity and explore why it has not stopped its provocations. Lastly, this 

























Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The United States government has employed a myriad of strategies in its approach 
to issues of foreign policy.  These have included unilateral, bilateral and multilateral 
forms of engagement. However, in the text Multilateralism & U.S. Foreign Policy: 
Ambivalent Engagement, Patrick and Forman state: “For the United States, 
multilateralism is no longer a choice - it’s a matter of necessity.”13 There are some in 
international relations, primarily subscribers to the theories of liberalism, who believe 
that multilateralism is swiftly becoming the only option in approaches to foreign policy 
for any state.  However, the United States seems to wane back and forth with respect to 
these foreign policy approaches.  Patrick and Forman go on to say “The United States is 
often ambivalent in terms of its broader foreign policy, which can seem to send mixed 
messages when unilateral action and multilateral strategies are engaged 
simultaneously.”14  Polling data suggests “the public would prefer to address foreign 
policy challenges through multilateral institutions and partnerships.”15 While it may be 
true that the general public supports this form of engagement, that does not necessarily 
ring true for American policymakers. I would argue that U.S. foreign policymakers tend 
to be consistently hawkish in spite of fluctuations of public sentiment on the topic of 
national security. Policymakers who favor the notion of American exceptionalism–where 
the US is ‘the’ superpower and must do whatever necessary for its security and survival-










United States has chosen an overwhelmingly multilateral approach to deal with North 
Korea and its nuclear program. This approach with the DPRK is interesting, as it 
represents a more subdued approach when compared to the U.S.’s more aggressive 
actions when faced with the belligerent regimes of other countries such as Iraq, Libya or 
groups such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria. 
Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman explore the U.S. relationship in the world 
and its place in American foreign policy as well as the U.S.’s often vacillating courses of 
action. The editors relate how “The 9-11 attacks made two things abundantly clear: The 
United States is vulnerable to international threats, and sustained multilateral cooperation 
will be essential in confronting those dangers.”16 While the editors are advocates of 
multilateral cooperation, they do relate several justifications for taking the unilateral route 
including “freedom of action abroad,” its ability to “exercise its largely unchallenged 
power to advance its interests” and an altruistic “American hegemony as the basis of 
world order.”17 The reality is that the foreign policy trials of the modern era make it 
difficult to take concrete unilateral action without involving other states. This text looks 
at why the United States has been ambivalent and what have been the results of these 
mixed messages. By taking a look at the roots of this incongruity, it notes a certain 
discomfort with multilateralism but also the ironic point that the United States is the one 
that has led the charge on state-to-state cooperation. I would argue that this stated 
‘discomfort’ is gradually fading away because I believe the policymakers of today 







partners and that utilizing a group-work mindset spreads out responsibilities and also puts 
other states skin in the game with the United States.  
The authors ask a very interesting question: “What is the appropriate role of 
multilateral cooperation in pursuing the national interest?”18 I believe the United States is 
doing what is in its best interest and in this case, that would be multilateral engagement. 
The authors go on to explain how rare it is for unilateral action to be efficient and also 
that policymakers must be cognizant of how a multilateral approach can actually shore up 
American power. This is one of the main points of this book and it is important to relate it 
to the topic of North Korea. By choosing the multilateral track, the United States has 
illustrated its intent to cooperate with the key players in the region as well as show 
respect for these states as each member is on equal footing in the Six-Party talks. While 
there may be an extraordinary instance when the U.S. would take unilateral action with 
North Korea, it has a better hand working with the regional entities. Nuclear weapons 
policy is brought up in the ninth chapter of the book and the authors argue “A unilateral 
trend in U.S. nuclear weapons policy has dangerous implications for international peace 
and security.”19 This could be a possible reason for North Korean paranoia and worry 
regarding the intentions of the United States. Such a unilateral trend by the United States 
when these weapons were present also provided a possible subject for the North Koreans 
to exploit as a reason for them not engaging in diplomacy.  
Patrick and Forman relate how some analysts believe that “The country is so 







commitments appear increasingly to be unjustified impositions on U.S. sovereignty and 
political autonomy.”20 I would argue that in spite of this, the United States has realized in 
the case of North Korea that regional partnerships and a multilateral commitment to 
diplomacy among the nations in the area in such platforms as the Six-Party talks or at the 
U.N. Security Council are the most practical option. The text on Multilateralism and U.S. 
Foreign Policy relates how “Multilateralism can play a critical role, since it signals 
strategic restraint and the willingness of the United States to exercise its power within 
agreed-upon rules and institutions.” 21  This is precisely part of my argument about 
multilateral engagement in that it implies a tactical check by the U.S. on its actions in 
dealing with the DPRK and the other states in the region. The U.S. illustrates this point 
by communicating with its two main East Asian regional partners (South Korea and 
Japan) before implementing policy concerning the DPRK and also seriously considering 
the ramifications of its actions and their effect on China and Russia. 
The book Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization 
1919-1999 by Edward Luck also explores American ambivalence. He speaks of the 
reality that “Persistent strains of idealism and cynicism, multilateralism and unilateralism, 
internationalism and isolationism have long coexisted across the spectrum of American 
thinking.”22 This described reality is a clear example of an American ambivalent mindset. 
He also points out an occasional but critical impediment that manifests itself which is a 









same vein, he speaks of American ambivalence towards international organizations (and 
multilateralism) as stemming “from the nation’s political culture, from the structure of its 
institutions of government, and from its place in the hierarchy of nations, as well as from 
the values and attitudes of its people.”23 This speaks to American exceptionalism and can 
help to describe how this mindset or perspective can inhibit U.S. foreign policymakers 
from openly and willingly embracing multilateral engagement. Luck relates how over 
time American ambivalence has caused several casualties including: “the integrity of 
international law, the viability of the global system, the credibility of American 
commitments to international undertakings, and relationships with key allies, whose often 
self-righteous reactions have contributed to a downward spiral of recriminations and 
mistrust.”24 This list of casualties illustrates a serious threat to sound U.S. foreign policy. 
However, there is hope for United States foreign policy in dealing with North Korea and 
its nuclear program. It is important to highlight two very significant points, which are 
America’s continued commitment to multilateral platforms such as membership in the 
Six-Party talks along with the U.N. Security Council and also its relationships with two 
historical allies in the region, where interactions with South Korea and Japan can make a 
noteworthy difference in negotiations with the other three members of the Six-Party talks 
and the discussions among the members of the Security Council. 
Edward Luck relates another aspect of American exceptionalism when he states 







bilateral in the sense that it is us and them – whether they be one or a hundred nations.”25 
This statement speaks volumes on a rather frequent theme where American policymakers 
are historically not necessarily interested in a multilateral relationship. He further 
comments that, “Surely Americans are not the only nationalistic people in the world, yet 
the nation’s history, geography, power, and political culture do work to set it apart.”26 
While some say the United States should stay out of foreign predicaments, other 
policymakers speak of the burden of exceptionalism, whereby the United States has a 
responsibility to be a leader in global relations because of its vast wealth and power. “To 
maintain its privileged position in a dynamic world, they would argue, the United States 
should actively work to build those international institutions and norms that can reinforce 
peace, stability, and democratic values.”27 This camp would be supportive of the Six 
Party talks and Security Council platform, and the United States taking the lead in 
discussions. Balance of power theory is clearly at play with North Korea feeling 
threatened and flexing its muscles by ultimately acquiring nuclear weapons. This would 
explain their pursuit of nuclear weapons as more of a defensive mechanism or deterrent 
and a wild card to protect their sovereignty and also better their hand at the negotiating 
table. 
There is a reference by Edward Luck in Mixed Messages that shines a strong light 
on where he stands on multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. At one point in his book, he 
relates how there was a point during the start of the Cold War when some in the United 








United Nations.28 He notes how it was Secretary of State George C. Marshall “who 
recognized, unlike many of his contemporaries, that for America’s friends and allies, 
participation in strong multilateral organizations and arrangements was a matter of 
necessity, not choice. 29  This highlighting of Marshall’s apt comprehension of the 
essential need to welcome and pursue multilateral engagement show that Edward Luck 
strongly supports this approach. 
 The book “Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea,” by Leon 
V. Sigal focuses on the crisis in the 1990s where there was nearly a major conflict 
(perhaps even war) between the United States and the DPRK. It is important to take a 
look at Sigal’s text because he lays out what happened and what lessons can be learned 
from this near catastrophe. While the events he discusses did occur in the early 1990s, 
they do offer valuable lessons that can be applied to the present day. Sigal relates at the 
beginning of his book how at the New York Times in June of 1990 he wrote an editorial 
in which he had urged the United States to ‘help the Koreas in from the cold’ by “coaxing 
them into military disengagement and diplomatic reengagement.”30 This action would be 
the promotion of bilateral engagement between North Korea and South Korea. I would 
argue that if such a thaw occurred, it would be highly unlikely not to have involved the 
United States and the other key players in the region such as China, Russia and Japan, 
thereby implying Sigal’s support for multilateral engagement. He also discusses another 









the North” and while it was cut during editing, he did originally include a proposal for the 
“unilateral withdrawal of U.S. nuclear arms from the peninsula.”31  Once again, this 
‘unilateral withdrawal’ would most likely not occur without at least the bilateral 
consultation of the United States and South Korea. There is a strong argument that can be 
made that any major alterations of the security posture by the United States in South 
Korea (such as the introduction or removal of nuclear weapons) would be closely 
coordinated in a bilateral discussion with South Korea and in addition with Japan, 
America’s other strong ally in the region. Such a scenario would support my argument of 
America’s ultimate choice of multilateral engagement in the region. With these 
proposals, Sigal at that time not only got the ear of many officials familiar with the 
regional dynamics but also illustrated a forward-thinking mindset in diplomacy with 
North Korea. This is a compelling reason to analyze his book and see what can be helpful 
to my research on U.S. ambivalence and American multilateralism in North Korea. 
 In his book, Leon Sigal discusses an “American unwillingness to cooperate with 
strangers.”32  It is an interesting statement because the United States not only was integral 
to the creation of the precursor of what would become the United Nations, that leading 
intergovernmental organization that focuses on cooperation, but also as the sole global 
superpower and so-called leader of the free world, the United States is deeply involved 
throughout the globe in numerous missions. Therefore, I would disagree with Sigal’s 
assertion of America’s reluctance to work with others.  With that said and in light of this 







believes is the reality clearly illustrates an aspect of the ambiguity of the United States. 
Sigal mentions certain states that we have “recoiled from giving cooperation a chance” 
including ‘Cuba’ and the ‘Palestinians’ but I would argue that the United States does 
reach out to these so-called ‘strangers’ and this is evident with the recent talks to gain 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, current negotiations with Iran as well as the history of 
working with Israel and the Palestinians to broker peace, which is a clear example of 
American multilateral diplomacy.33 
 Multilateralism does not always necessarily bring positive results. Sigal aptly 
mentions how “A strategy of cooperative security, not coercive diplomacy, accounts for 
the success of diplomacy in Korea.” 34  He relates how certain displays of coercive 
diplomacy have basically infuriated North Korea. Examples of these include sanctions 
and U.S./South Korea regional Team Spirit joint military exercises that have actually led 
to North Korea heightening its defense posture and becoming agitated. Therefore, these 
multilateral tools of sanctions and military exercises actually have a direct negative effect 
on North Korea. While these actions may be completely warranted, the agitation and 
aggressive rhetoric is the chosen reaction by the DPRK and those who implement these 
tools must take this into account. 
The book “Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle,” edited by David Albright 
and Kevin O’Neill, looks at the work done to stop North Korea from attaining nuclear 
weapons during the 1990s up until the year 2000. It accurately describes the situation as 







policy challenges for the United States and perhaps the world: a nuclear North Korea. 
The book is basically divided into five sections with the first looking at the history of the 
North Korean nuclear program, the status of the Agreed Framework at that time (in 
2000), and an overhead look at the Yongbyon nuclear site. The second section takes a 
technical approach to the nuclear challenge that includes discussions on IAEA 
inspections and the plutonium quantities present in the DPRK. The third section looks at 
the bilateral Agreed Framework closely and what may be in store for the future of the 
agreement. It also looks at challenges and progress on the peninsula and the methodology 
utilized by the Clinton administration. I would argue that the best times in U.S./DPRK 
relations in recent memory were during this time because of the bilateral engagement that 
was occurring, especially with the trip which I highlight in my research, when Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright met with Kim Jong Il in North Korea. Section Four examines 
the sunshine policy implemented by Kim Dae Jung and the topic of the importance of a 
more unambiguous North Korea. This implies that North Korea has not been transparent 
and supports my argument that the DPRK is also ambivalent in its actions.  
Toward the end of this book on the North Korean puzzle, there is a statement that 
should be highlighted. The peninsula is described as a place where each side realizes the 
magnitude and potential destruction of an armed conflict and “This relative stability, if 
not disturbed, can provide the time and conditions for all sides to pursue a permanent 
peace on the peninsula, ending at last the Korean War and perhaps ultimately leading to 
the peaceful unification of the Korean people – this is the lasting goal of U.S. policy.”35 
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The significance of this sentence cannot be overstated because it identifies a major 
foreign policy objective of the United States in Korea and I would agree with this 
assertion. When this paramount goal of U.S. policy is discussed, the presence of U.S. 
troops on the peninsula comes to mind because one may wonder if they are there to keep 
the peace or if there are ulterior motives such as keeping American boots on the ground at 
the doorstep of China and Russia. I asked Lt. Col. Rosa about the troop presence in Korea 
and his answer helps to shed light on the main reason. He said, “The United States does 
not want to have troops anywhere where they are not needed and that they are there to 
keep the peace between these two countries.”36 It is a basic but superb answer because I 
would argue that it illustrates how the United States does play a stabilizing role in the 
region and also that this continued peace and eventual peaceful reunification would most 
likely involve the assistance of U.S. troops. Also, part of my takeaway from his statement 
is that they are not there to check China and Russia because their goal is to stop any 
conflict specifically on the peninsula. 
It is helpful to consider if the works I focus on in my literature review address my 
main argument and if so, how do they do this? The books on Multilateralism and U.S. 
Foreign Policy as well as Mixed Messages support my main argument that the United 
States is ambivalent in its foreign policy, with an ultimate preference for multilateral 
engagement. Each goes into great detail on how the United States is ambiguous in its 
foreign policy. One example expresses this simply by noting that “By 2001, the United 
States was a member of hundreds of intergovernmental multilateral organizations and 






the United States with more opportunities to express its ambivalence.”37 Another example 
relates how former Secretary of State Dean Acheson discussed two schools of thought 
were prevalent in America, isolation and a dream of universal law and that “much of his 
career was devoted to finding a third way, a more pragmatic blend of idealism, national 
interests, and realistic tactics, whether through unilateral action, ad hoc coalitions, 
standing alliances, or international institutions.”38 I believe this is still the case today and 
this statement supports my argument of ambivalence because it describes different tactics 
by the United States that might appear to be ambiguous to an observer who sees a diverse 
set of actions by the U.S. With that said, it is important to note that three of the four 
blends are forms of multilateral engagement and that I do contend that unilateral 
engagement still exists in U.S. policy but is quite rare because of its potentially negative 
consequences.  
 While I disagree with Leon Sigal’s contention in Disarming Strangers that the 
U.S. utilizes coercive diplomacy especially when looking through a contemporary lens, 
he does address how the U.S. must focus on engagement and cooperation, which I 
believe currently is and should be a priority in American foreign policy. My research will 
analyze this engagement, provide examples and also illustrate a challenge that faces 
American policymakers, which is a tendency to be ambiguous. The research will delve 
into foreign policy under the last three administrations, which will help shed a light on 
and provide examples of this tendency. It will also show that the United States is 







 In Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, David Albright and Kevin O’Neill 
bring to light the efforts to stop North Korea from going nuclear which we now know 
were ultimately unsuccessful. It relates a struggle between the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the North Koreans where the North Koreans eventually 
withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). At the time, this struggle led to some 
in the United States calling for military action to stop the DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and later a visit from former President Jimmy Carter that ultimately lowered 
tensions through the Agreed Framework. I argue that the U.S. has been a key player in 
bringing about multilateral engagement and the history related in this literature supports 
this. The U.S. was the one who proposed discussions that started as the Four-Party talks 
(North Korea, South Korea, China and the U.S.) and that eventually became the Six Party 
talks, which also included Russia and Japan.39 My research will take a close look at the 
Six-Party talks and other multilateral platforms including the U.N. Security Council at the 
United Nations. 
An important aspect to consider is what my research will add to the literature? A 
considerable part of this is the information gleaned from primary sources, especially my 
interviews with seasoned professionals of diplomacy. A close look at my sources and 
discussions with the interviewees has helped clarify my arguments. In addition, they have 
provided some interesting revelations and inquiries to consider. These include the idea of 
utilizing mid-level diplomacy such as the type South Korea tends to employ, more 






regarding a theoretical major change in North Korea such as collapse or regime change.40 
Another aspect is looking at the situation from a military perspective, which from my 
discussions with a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, actually translates into a strong 
focus on diplomacy and avoiding a military solution at nearly all costs.41 I believe that 
my research will ultimately support continued emphasis on diplomacy to work towards a 
resolution on the Korean peninsula and also that the U.S. must be cognizant that 


































Chapter 3: One-on-One Description / Bilateral Engagement 
 
One-on-One talks between the United States and the DPRK have the potential to 
produce results. After all, “Bilateral talks are not merely a ‘gift’ to be conferred on other 
governments, but a vector to convey US perspectives unalloyed and undiluted by 
multilateral engagement.” 42  These discussions can illustrate American foreign policy 
objectives clearly and allow for moving forward with resolutions. It appears that this type 
of engagement is a priority for the DPRK. History has made this apparent because on 
multiple occasions, when Americans have been held captive, securing their release has 
involved high-level American leaders such as former Presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy 
Carter or former Governor Bill Richardson visiting the DPRK to meet with North Korean 
officials to negotiate for their release. These One-on-One, bilateral talks imply respect for 
the other party’s status and legitimacy as a state and although they go unofficially to 
secure the release of Americans, I believe North Korea sees these negotiations as an 
opportunity to show the world that they engaged (in their view) in direct talks with the 
United States. 
 One example of direct bilateral talks occurred in the early 1990s when 
Representative Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs spoke with Kim Il Sung about nuclear weapons. Interestingly, the founder 









He then said “They’d be useless – if we fire them, they will kill the Korean people.”44 
This can be interpreted to mean that North Korea understands that any nuclear attack by 
North Korea on the South, would result in the United States and its allies initiating a full 
retaliatory response, ultimately destroying North Korea. Such a scenario would prove 
catastrophic for the peninsula, with substantial losses in the South from the first strike, 
compounded by severe or near total losses in the North from counter strikes.  Essentially, 
beyond the extreme loss of life and property, the North Korean regime would lose its grip 
on power as South Korea and its allies under the US nuclear umbrella responded to the 
initial attack. 
Another intriguing takeaway from the exchange between Representative Solarz 
and Kim Il Sung was that after the meeting, Solarz landed in Seoul to speak with 
President Roh Tae Woo, who at that time, favored taking the lead in conferring with the 
North. Roh was against direct American dialogue with North Korea on the nuclear 
subject.45  Whether or not such opposition to direct US/North Korean talks exists in 
today’s South Korean administration is something that should be considered.  
To shed light on bilateral engagement between the United States and North 
Korea, I would like to look at two case studies when such engagement occurred. It must 
be noted that one of the examples was not officially sanctioned by the U.S. administration 
at the time. However, in that case, it is difficult to imagine that it did not have the 
unofficial blessing of the U.S. leadership because the primary purpose was rescuing 







Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveled to North Korea at a time of 
warming relations in an often-frosty historical relationship. This was the highest-level 
official visit by the United States that had ever occurred. It was the year 2000 and the 
groundwork was laid by a visit to Pyongyang by former Defense Secretary William Perry 
and State Department Counselor Wendy Sherman. Their positive meeting, Kim Dae-
jung’s sunshine policy which included a bilateral face-to-face meeting between Kim Dae-
jung and Kim Jong-il as well as a reciprocal visit by the DPRK’s second in command of 
the military Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, all contributed to a situation where the next 
step was a high level American visit. While Vice Marshal Rok personally invited 
President Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright relates how “The President suggested I go 
first to prepare the ground.”46 Secretary of State Albright’s trip to Pyongyang was a 
significant step for both sides and this would most likely explain North Korea’s 
acceptance of her visit before the requested Presidential visit. Secretary of State Albright 
did bring a letter from President Clinton regarding “the expectation of further developing 
relations” between the two nations and in a toast at dinner with Kim Jong Il, Dr. Albright 
spoke of the process of engagement, stating “It can lead to reconciliation and 
reunification of the peninsula and to more normal and prosperous relations between your 
government and others in the region and world.”47 The dinner appeared to bear fruit as 
there was talk on a moratorium on nuclear weapons. However, Madeleine Albright 
related “We were in the process of testing North Korean intentions when the Clinton 
																																																								








Administration’s time ran out.”48 With the new administration, the torch was not picked 
up where the Clinton administration left it and the U.S./DPRK relationship unfortunately 
faltered once again. 
In 2009, journalists Lisa Ling and Euna Lee were filming a documentary and had 
crossed over the North Korean border where they were actually arrested by North Korea. 
Former Obama administration Senior Director for East Asian Affairs Jeffrey Bader 
recalled the moment when the revelation came that the two journalists had been detained: 
Our team knew immediately that the North Koreans would hold 
the journalists and use them for leverage on political and security issues 
before considering their release, probably when a senior U.S. politician 
was dispatched to pick them up (such was their history). We were 
determined not to accept North Korean extortion and its linkage to other 
issues.49 
While Washington demanded their release, the women were sentenced to eight 
years hard labor. The Obama administration offered a visit from former President Bill 
Clinton only after they refused an offer to send Al Gore who also happened to be the 
employer of the two journalists at the time of their arrest. The Obama administration took 
pains to illustrate that this was not an officially sanctioned trip but actually a 
humanitarian mission. This included Clinton traveling there in an unmarked jet, denying 
that Clinton carried a message from the sitting President (as the North Koreans asserted), 
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and the White House describing the visit as ‘private.’50 In the end, the North Koreans 
basically exploited a nice photo opportunity with the American contingent and DPRK 
leadership. The journalist Jack Kim notes how “It allows the government to show to a 
domestic audience, facing deepening poverty, that the nuclear weapons program is 
making the outside world take it more seriously and the visit will be certain to be 
portrayed as tribute by the United States.”51 With that taken into account, Clinton’s visit 
did ultimately secure the release of the journalists. 
As noted before, there is notable merit in the ability of direct dialogue between 
the two nations to make progress in a way that cannot be achieved through other states. In 
regards to North Korea, I agree with analysts who believe that bilateral talks with the 
United States is one of North Korea’s ultimate goals, in that such negotiations are seen as 
elevating the status of the North Korean leadership on the world stage. The argument can 
be made that bilateral talks have proven somewhat fruitful. In the case studies above 
when all was said and done, North Korea ultimately acquiesced to American overtures to 
release captive American citizens and it can be argued in the case of Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright’s visit to North Korea, sitting down with Kim Jong Il for a face-to-














Chapter 4: Multilateral Engagement 
 
In an ever-growing interconnected and globalized world, multilateral engagement 
increasingly becomes an important tool for diplomacy. Concerns about the DPRK’s 
growing nuclear program and nuclear proliferation are heightened among its regional 
neighbors, especially the historic foes of the DPRK (Japan and South Korea). The United 
States cannot be excluded from this list because while its nearest territory is a 
considerable distance away, the presence of military bases in South Korea, Japan and 
surrounding territories as well as the Korean War legacy mean that it is undoubtedly 
present in this group. In addition, the current U.S. official policy places South Korea and 
Japan under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and therefore any action against 
South Korea or Japan would most likely draw in the United States. American forward 
deployed troops in both nations also translate into the U.S. being very concerned about 
any North Korean provocations. The importance of the American relationship with South 
Korea and Japan is paramount for East Asian security and stability as well as American 
defense. Strong bilateral relationships with these two allies are part of the multilateral 
framework and will continue to be a part of the American security posture and foreign 
policy for the foreseeable future. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has noted 
that “Helping other countries better provide for their own security will be a key and 










 China has been the closest ally of the DPRK for at least half a century. The 
former Soviet Union or modern day Russia has also been a historic ally of the DPRK. In 
spite of these formidable historic ties, Russia and China are deeply concerned about what 
an aggressive North Korea could mean for the region as well as one that is a nuclear 
proliferator. They most likely realize that the DPRK could make the region less safe, in 
essence directly affecting their own security. Such was the case in 2009 when Deputy 
Secretary of State James Steinberg “argued persuasively that the Chinese would be 
unlikely to put sufficient pressure on Pyongyang unless they calculated that North Korean 
behavior was affecting their own security interests.”53 The Obama administration heeded 
Steinberg’s advice, which included sending a delegation to Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo to 
explain basically that North Korea’s aggression and pursuit of nuclear weapons “would 
inevitably cause the United States and its allies to alter their security posture to respond 
to the emerging threat.”54 This delegation was an illustrative example of multilateral 
engagement at work, where Washington wanted to make sure its two traditional allies in 
the region (South Korea and Japan) were on board (which they were) and then presented 
their case to Beijing. Former Senior Director for East Asian Affairs Jeffrey Bader writes 
“Eventually, our visit and discussions bore fruit and we worked closely with the Chinese 
and Russians to pass a UN Security Council resolution that imposed the most draconian 
sanctions ever placed on North Korea.” 55  Some of the highlights of this resolution 








inspection process to make sure North Korean vessels were not transporting arms.56 The 
above situation is a prime example of the United States using liberal means through 
bilateral and multilateral engagement to have other states help put pressure on Pyongyang 
to stifle its aggression and ultimately shore up the security of the U.S. and its allies. It 
illustrates the diversification of U.S. foreign policy practices to achieve U.S. goals. 
Furthermore, the U.S. cleverly communicated an implicit warning to China and Russia 
that they may not like what was going to happen if the U.S. and its partners felt the need 
to increase their security posture. In the end, this was a win for the U.S. and its allies 
because China and Russia felt compelled to get on board in isolating the DPRK by 
helping to diffuse the situation and not provide a justification for the United States and its 
allies to strengthen their security posture. 
As you can see from the graph on the next page, there has been a recent startling 
revelation by China about what they believe are the accurate numbers and projected 














Graph C: “China Warns Nuclear Threat is Rising: Pyongyang Could Double  




“The latest Chinese estimates, relayed in a closed-door meeting with U.S. nuclear 
specialists, showed that North Korea may already have 20 warheads, as well as the 











according to people briefed on the matter.”58 Former U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations John Bolton highlights how “Beijing’s judgment may be imperfect, but its 
enormous presence and influence in the North make it far likelier to be accurate than US, 
Japanese, or South Korean estimates.” 59  Therefore, China’s revelation about opaque 
North Korea should not be taken lightly. China’s priority is its security and the last thing 
it wants to do is put out information that may put the region on edge. Therefore, China 
coming out with this revelation about the DPRK’s increasing nuclear capability may 
illustrate that they are equally as stunned and concerned. Dr. Stephen Noerper has stated 
that “When it comes to missile and nuclear issues the Chinese are the big losers because 
it draws great attention to the area and also raises the risk of safety concerns and mishaps 
and creates a lot of concern in China.”60 
China does play an important role in dealing with North Korean aggression and 
nuclear proliferation because of its close historical ties to North Korea. “It has loosened 
its ties but remains more closely involved with Pyongyang than any other player and also 
retains the most leverage of any outsider, as the provider of the majority of North Korea’s 
fuel and food, without which Pyongyang’s economy could not survive.”61 It can be a 
bridge between the United States and North Korea and serve as an intermediary between 
the two nations to work towards a peaceful resolution in the region. This ‘bridge’ would 
be a clear example of multilateralism at work. However, the United States must be 










ability to influence the DPRK. With that said, the fact is that China has kept North Korea 
alive in a sense and this cannot be discounted. Dr. Noerper notes that “with fuel, food 
stuffs and an active Chinese business community, China has propped up the North 
Korean economy significantly.”62 The U.S. economy is also deeply connected to China 
and it has been said that “The U.S.-China relationship is the most important bilateral 
economic relationship in the world.”63 While this statement focuses on the economic 
connection, the exchange between China and the United States on security and other 
sectors has far-reaching ramifications for the future of both nations, East Asia and our 
world. It is also in the strategic interest of arguably the number two world power of China 
to keep the peace in the region. For a nation that has seen a rapid rise in the last few 
decades, perhaps the last thing it wants to do is get embroiled in a situation that may lead 
to a conflict with the United States. Furthermore, China may be fearful of or against the 
idea of a robust democracy being on its doorstep should North Korea collapse or be 
overrun. Therefore, China may see North Korea as a contentious but necessary buffer 
state. 
 
Six-Party Talks and the United Nations 
 
“American foreign policy on North Korea is not conducted in a vacuum, 
considering that South Korea, China, Japan, and even Russia have vital interests on the 








sustaining the situation.”64 A large piece of the puzzle in addressing the North Korean 
nuclear program is the main platform where discussion has taken place among these key 
regional players; the Six-Party talks. The Six-Party talks can be considered an 
international entity that consists of the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia 
and North Korea. The talks were born out of the DPRK leaving the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, which caused an immediate heightening of tension in 
the region and world. In mentioning its sporadic refusal to cooperate in these talks, it 
should be noted that North Korea also often sends mixed signals and this ambivalence 
will also be examined. In the end, the Six-Party talks are one of the most important pieces 
in the nuclear puzzle and its success or failure can have immediate and grave 
consequences. 
Former Special Representative for North Korean Policy at the State Department 
and senior diplomat Glynn Davies argues, “North Korea is responsible for North Korean 
actions, and resolving the DPRK problem is a multilateral task, just as the DPRK’s 
original aggression against the South was met with a strong response from the United 
Nations.”65 Looking at the historical background, the challenges encountered with the 
DPRK do go back to the unified repudiation by the coordination of a United Nations 
cooperative. This may help explain what some perceive as the DPRK feeling slighted in 
diplomatic circles compared to South Korea. Dr. Stephen Noerper relates how “North 










it didn’t and after the Cold War, you see a dramatic dropoff compared to South Korea’s 
heady rise in diplomatic circles.”66 Davies also stated in 2014 that “Standing up to North 
Korea requires a sustained and concerted effort by all of the countries in the Six-Party 
process, and indeed the entire international community.”67 This is a clear endorsement of 
utilizing multilateral engagement to deal with an aggressive North Korea and description 
by Davies essentially describes the DPRK as a bully that the other five members and 
indeed the world community must defend against. Interestingly, if the North Koreans 
could give their perspective, they would most likely say that they are the ones being 
bullied and painted into a corner. The fact is that the DMZ is the most heavily fortified 
border in the world and that alone leads it to be a possible devastating powder keg in the 
event of any misstep or misunderstanding. This helps explain the significance of and need 
for sound diplomacy and using the many items in the tool kit including an entity such as 
the Six-Party talks. The danger of another armed conflict in the region and its global 
security ramifications also explain why four other nations are involved in the talks 
between the Koreas and why it is a topic of great importance at the United Nations. 
Another concern is that working with regional partners and showing that the 
United States is committed to working on a solution help give it a stronger hand. The 
former United States Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice spoke of this strength 
in a unified response when she said in February of 2013 after a recent North Korean 
missile test, “We have been very clear and united in demanding North Korea comply 








the Korean peninsula.”68 The United States actually strengthens its position by agreeing 
to work with those in the area and that it is invested in reaching a solution through the Six 
Party Talks. Ambassador Rice said “We continue to work with our Six-Party partners to 
find a diplomatic path that protects peace and stability on the peninsula.”69  
 When asked how the United States uses the United Nations to achieve its goals, 
Lt. Col. Rosa said that “the Six Party talks generate there and that a significant amount of 
the quasi-bilateral help that assists the population in North Korea especially with food 
shortages generates from the relationships with the ambassadors at the United Nations.”70 
The importance of the Security Council cannot be overstated. Interestingly, but not 
surprising, Lt. Col. Rosa stated that “North Korea is a common topic among the 15 
member Security Council and if it wasn’t for the relationships of those 15 members, he 
thinks we would see much more risky behavior by the North Korean government.”71 
Therefore the Security Council serves as a multilateral vanguard to stave off or deescalate 
North Korean aggression. 
 The United Nations is a global instrument that plays a pivotal role in dealing with 
North Korea. It offers a platform for all sides to voice concerns and objections. It also 















a core member of the United Nations Security Council, the United States can use its 
influence to offer North Korea both carrots and sticks. While the veto power of Security 
Council members can override American proposals, on several occasions the Security 
Council has been unified in its response (sanctions, maritime searches, etc.) to North 
Korea, especially responding to its provocations, which must send a strong message to 
Pyongyang. North Korea faces a much harder fight alone and sanctions can bite harder 
with a coalition backing them. 
 A clear example of the U.N. Security Council uniting to work against North 
Korean brinkmanship was U.N. Resolution 2087 in 2013 which basically condemned at 
that time the latest missile test in December of 2012. This multilateral resolution “took 
direct aim at key figures and trading companies involved in North Korea’s nuclear and 
space programs, froze the country’s assets, and banned the trade of relevant 
technologies.”72 These hardline sanctions and unanimous resolution were meant to deter 
North Korea from further provocation. Unfortunately, it seemed to have the opposite 
effect with North Korea carrying out its third nuclear test in February 2013. Therefore, 
this multilateral resolution had good intentions to curtail North Korean behavior but the 
result was ultimately negative with the nuclear test. 
There does seem to be an ongoing debate intensifying on the pros and cons of 
multilateralism. While the above statements illustrate the United States approach and 
merits of multilateral engagement, there are some who see otherwise. Domestic concerns 








multilateralism, policy makers and those in control on the home front have illustrated that 
they not only don’t always prefer multilateral engagement but are actually wary of it in 
many cases, preferring a unilateral or even isolationist approach. Patrick and Forman 
claim, 
Policymakers in Washington are often critical of what they see as possible 
pitfalls of multilateralism: ‘free riding’ (on public goods that the US may 
provide), ‘buck passing’ (since responsibility tends to be diffused), and the 
premium on consensus can slow decisions, dilute objectives, constrain 
instruments, and culminate in policies of the lowest common 
denominator.73 
These same critics also worry that multilateral engagement may ensnare the United States 
in ventures far from its shores or not necessarily in the best interest of the nation.  
 As stated, multilateralism can “dilute objectives” as noted by Patrick and Forman 
and this is evident in an incident that occurred in 2010.74 Looking at the case of the 
sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean naval ship that was attacked in 2010 with many 
pointing the finger at North Korea, Lt. Col. Guillermo Rosa stated that “The Russians 
said that there is not definite evidence that the North Koreans did it and the fact is in 
multilateral engagement, the more parties you involve, the more opinions you are going 
to find.”75 In this case, Russia spoke out basically in defense of North Korea when the 
allegations against the DPRK came out. Whether or not North Korea had spoken to 








even after an investigative panel was launched with evidence indicating it was the North 
Koreans, the findings were ultimately not accepted by the Russians who rendered the 
panel’s finding inconclusive. The Security Council did issue a presidential statement 
condemning the attack but as it did not name the attacker and was not a Security Council 
resolution, it lacked any substantial clout. 
Historically, there were politicians in the United States who resented America 
being placed on the same footing as what they think are inferior nations. A platform such 
as the Six-Party talks and the UN Security Council give each member an equal vote, 
which implies equal authority among each member. I believe the bulk of U.S. officials no 
longer feel this way. I believe the majority of Americans want a peaceful resolution to 
conflict or disagreement and would prefer diplomacy in mitigating these challenges. One 
example of diplomacy in action are the bilateral meetings that have taken place between 
the U.S. and the DPRK on the sidelines of the UN summits. Another is the continual 
discussions that occur before and after meetings at the UN as well as the frank discussion 
that occurs during meetings. Former Deputy Military Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations Lt. Col. Rosa explained how many discussions are occurring officially 














Chapter 5: Ambivalence / Confusion 
 
In his seminal book, Edward Luck “marshals overwhelming evidence of public 
support for the United Nations and international engagement through multinational 
organizations.” 77  In spite of its ambivalence, the American people overwhelmingly 
support a multilateral approach in dealing with North Korea and its nuclear program. 
While the public appears to be very supportive of multilateralism, there are skeptics, 
especially in policymaking circles. As these men and women formulate U.S. foreign 
policy, it seems logical that their skepticism contributes to this ambivalence.  I am 
arguing that the United States is using liberalism because it feels that multilateralism is 
the most rational option and ultimately in the best interest of the United States. I’d like to 
propose that the United States continue on the multilateral track as well as keep open the 
door to bilateral negotiations with North Korea. Of course in reality, any talks that are 
bilateral in nature would include keeping the other members of the Six-Party talks in the 
loop with special attention and information flowing to the U.S.’s two main East Asian 
allies, South Korea and Japan. 
American ambivalence or ambiguity was on display during two actions taken at 
nearly the same time by the U.S. in 2005. “In the immediate wake of the 2005 joint 
statement, and seemingly in a manner not fully coordinated within the U.S. government, 
Washington froze North Korean accounts in a bank in Macau, Banco Delta Asia, 
believing it was a primary means for North Korean international proliferation activity and 







Six-Party mechanism in the joint statement where “North Korea agreed to a staged 
elimination of ‘all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs’ and to return ‘at an 
early date’ to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards.”79 On the American side, the U.S. would 
move towards setting up normal relations with the DPRK, guarantee that they would not 
attack the DPRK and also help get in motion shipments of heavy fuel oil.80 All this 
sounded like a huge step forward in the foreign policy quagmire of North Korea and its 
nuclear program. However, the freezing of North Korean assets infuriated the regime and 
‘in response, the North launched a Taepodong-2 (TPD-2) intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) test in July 2006 and detonated a nuclear device for the first time three months 
later.”81 In this example, these two different signals from the United States came with a 
high cost. While the North Korean aggressive actions cannot be justified, this was most 
likely retribution for the American asset freeze and a feeling that the United States had 
violated the feeling of progress and moving forward achieved with the joint statement. 
 Another side of this ambivalence that must not be ignored can be attributed to 
Pyongyang. In 2010, Peter Crail notes that “Despite Pyongyang’s willingness to continue 
discussions on the possibility of returning to negotiations it abandoned last year, it 
appears to be sending mixed messages to the international community.”82 The article 
goes on to describe how Chinese media relate that North Korea was ready to resume 
discussions while UN undersecretary-general for political affairs B. Lynn Pascoe who 










Koreans were certainly not eager to return to the Six-Party talks, although they have not 
ruled out a return.”83 Two basically opposite revelations of North Korea’s stance reveal 
how cloudy diplomacy can get and both sides may actually have been off the mark 
because neither were a North Korean official statement. 
Lee Hong Yung describes North Korea foreign policy behavior as 
“schizophrenic,” as Pyongyang went from declaring the ceasefire of 1953 invalid and 
threatening preemptive nuclear attack to saying that it would be agreeable to return to the 
Six Party Talks.84 Preemptive nuclear attacks are a bit much even for North Korean 
standards but such bellicose threats are sure to get attention and basically guarantee a 
response from the sole superpower in concert with its regional partners. The United 
States reacted with defensive maneuvering including flying B-2 stealth bombers over 
South Korea in a military exercise.85 While the essence of power is known as the ability 
to influence the behavior of others, these threats by North Korea did get American 
attention but ultimately prompted the United States to display its military prowess and 
therefore backfired. These threats also do not illustrate North Korea as a state that is 
mature or sure of itself. 
 The notion of a watershed moment or considerable change in policy under the 
new administration of Barack Obama in 2009 compared to that of George W. Bush was 
tangible at the time of President Obama’s election. Scott Snyder, the Senior Fellow for 










Korea Policy has stated that “At the start of the Obama administration’s first term in 
2009, there were many expectations that the United States might pursue direct talks with 
North Korea in order to break a two decade-long standoff over its nuclear program.”86 As 
there was a palpable tendency for a possible opening with President Obama’s declaration 
to “offer an outstretched hand to those who will unclench their fists,”87 North Korea 
replied to this proposal “with a multi-stage rocket launch and a nuclear test in April and 
May of 2009.”88 In a way, the DPRK seemed to say that they will not be dictated policy 
and will continue to do whatever they would like to, even with the expected American 
and world condemnation. This is exactly what occurred through the UN Security 
Council’s Resolution 1874, which “condemned North Korea’s nuclear and multi-stage 
rocket tests and subjected suspected North Korean nuclear-related shipments to 
international inspections.”89 It must be acknowledged that this was not the best start to a 
supposed reset relationship with North Korea under the new Obama administration.  
The situation under the administration of George W. Bush had been especially 
frosty. In what would be a serious blow to the U.S.–DPRK relationship, during President 
George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, he said “North Korea is a regime 
arming with missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), while starving its 
citizens” and “states like these (North Korea, Iran and Iraq) and their terrorist allies 
																																																								











constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world by seeking Weapons 
of Mass Destruction.”90 The situation was further exacerbated in that same year when 
Bush was quoted in a book by Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward as saying “I 
loathe Kim Jong Il, I’ve got a visceral reaction to this guy because he is starving his 
people.”91 It is necessary to take a step back and consider the ramifications of what 
President Bush stated officially in his State of the Union address and publicly in his 
interview for the book. He basically said North Korea is evil, a terrorist regime that 
starves its people and is in pursuit of WMD. Furthermore, he related personal hatred for 
the leader of the DPRK. Many analysts in diplomacy most likely cringed at Bush’s 
statements. Dr. Stephen Noerper of the Korea Society, who was at the U.S. State 
Department at the time of Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech, states “the North Koreans 
basically wrote off dealing with the Americans for eight years.”92 Therefore, this drove a 
direct wedge between the U.S. and DPRK relationship and was basically a nonstarter for 
any diplomatic efforts between the two nations. While it is impossible to know how the 
DPRK regime feels toward the United States, I believe they respect the U.S. because of 
its hard power and global reach. With that said, I don’t think they are necessarily very 
fond of the United States and during the Bush years, the US/DPRK relationship was 
perhaps at one of its lowest points. It is worth noting as described earlier with then 












meeting with Kim Jong Il, the U.S./DPRK relationship seemed to be going in a positive 
direction, but ultimately under President Bush the momentum stalled.  
 The presence of American troops has been a sticking point for the North as well 
as some in the South. China and Russia are also most likely not thrilled to have American 
troops on their doorstep. When questioned about the U.S. troop presence by Madeleine 
Albright, Kim Jong Il stated that “his government’s view has changed since the Cold 
War: American troops now played a stabilizing role.”93 While this answer probably came 
as a surprise to Dr. Albright and the U.S. administration at the time, an advisor to then 
South Korean President Kim Dae Jung said that Kim Jong Il had said “he was not totally 
opposed” while another South Korean official said North Korea “wants to retain some 
strategic ambiguity on this matter.”94 It would appear that ‘strategic ambiguity’ might 
actually strengthen a nation’s hand in diplomacy. By not being crystal clear, a state can 
walk back its statements and choose another path.  
A conversation I had with Lt. Col. Guillermo Rosa about diplomacy comes to 
mind when the notion of “strategic ambiguity” is mentioned. Lt. Col. Rosa stated that:  
In the Obama administration, a large amount of the foreign policy is 
rehearsed, meaning foreign policy statements are well-crafted and put out 
in a way that leaves enough room for the administration to say for 







different direction,’ in essence being very diplomatic or utilizing 
legalese.95 
The Obama administration appears to be more cautious and calculated in its actions than 
the previous administration. Also, it has the advantage of learning from what resulted 
from different actions from the Bush administration. The caveat here is that the Obama 
administration has employed a policy of ‘strategic patience.’ When asked about the 
policies under the previous two administrations, Dr. Noerper of the Korea Society has 
stated that:  
On North Korea, there has been no substantial progress; there was this 
sole notion of ‘strategic patience’ or in other words, perhaps ‘strategic 
ambiguity’ but it didn’t really see any types of options for creative 
engagement and during this entirety of the 15-16 year process now under 
two administrations, the DPRK appears to have done a little more than up 
its ability with missiles and nuclear development and that’s really very 
worrying.96  
This is indeed worrying and actually highlights that in all actuality, not much has 
changed under the last two administrations. It is interesting to note that Dr. Noerper used 
the same phrase of “strategic ambiguity” to describe U.S. foreign policy that the South 










Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
As the senior diplomat Glyn Davies outlined in 2014, there is a prerogative to 
shift Pyongyang’s focus “from believing that a nuclear program is necessary for regime 
survival to understanding that such a program is incompatible with national interests.”97 
Realist dimensions explain why North Korea has nuclear ambitions. It wants to be 
powerful in a neighborhood of formidable states. It can be argued that nuclear weapons 
provide it with the wherewithal to make an attack or infringement on its soil too costly 
and therefore serve as a deterrent. “The majority of international relations theories 
conclude that the source of threats is clear: power is threatening.”98 Balance of power 
theory dictates that a country can be intimidated by another’s capabilities and therefore 
will do its best to try to even the playing field. This theory helps explain why the bulk of 
North Korean forces are near the border with South Korea and the majority of North 
Korean artillery is pointed squarely at the heart of South Korea; the capital of Seoul. 
Also, it is important to note that Dr. Noerper of the Korea Society has stated that “There’s 
a stated U.S. official goal of denuclearization but most people in the analytical 
community have written that off a long time ago and therefore nonproliferation is 
probably the hoped for goal at this point.”99 
 
The DPRK Leadership 
 An important factor to consider is who makes up the leadership of the DPRK. 








very young, inexperienced leader who has been chosen to promulgate the Kim family 
dynasty and it appears that preserving the prestige and sustainability of his position may 
trump all other interests. It should be noted that the leader of North Korea has made no 
official foreign trips since he came to power in 2011.100 Looking at the leader of one of 
the DPRK’s closest historical allies, Chinese President Xi Jinping in his inaugural 
presidential year alone, traveled to Russia, the United States, Latin America and Africa 
all in 2013.101 This lack of foreign trips by Kim Jong Un contributes to the overall 
opaqueness of the North Korean regime and while North Korea accepted the invitation to 
attend the 70th Anniversary May Victory Day celebrations in Moscow, Kim Jong Un 
ultimately decided to not attend with the reason given by Russian officials that it had to 
do with “North Korea’s internal affairs.”102 What that actually means is hard to tell but 
the reality is that his grip on power is questionable and his insecurity has been on full 
display through several actions during his brief rule. One such example was in late 2013 
concerning his uncle. “The ruthless purge and execution of Jang Song-taek revealed the 
structural weakness of the ruling system.”103 For Kim to get rid of a relative and official 
(who dealt closely with China, the DPRK’s strongest ally) implies that he felt extremely 
threatened by Jang and wanted to make an example of him.  In a region where saving 
face is paramount, this public purge was the ultimate insult. More recently in late April of 












Defense Minister Hyon Yong-chol who was “as defense minister as close to Kim Jong Il 
as it is possible to get.”104 How Kim Jong Un can purge and execute his own uncle in 
2013 and one of his father’s closest confidante’s is quite troubling. Even more 
disconcerting is the revelation by the South Korean National Intelligence Agency (NIS) 
that “senior officials were being executed at the rate of one per week” and Stephen Evans 
of BBC News sums it up succinctly by stating “It all adds up to a picture of a leader in 
Pyongyang who feels very insecure and who is dangerous in his insecurity.”105 A leader 
of a regime with one of the largest standing militaries in the world and one that has an 
apparent internal power or administrative struggle is indeed dangerous and actually 
alarming. He appears to have no tolerance for dissent or the slightest insubordination, 
which may imply in his mind disrespect. “The over-the-top execution of a defense 
minister (Hyon Yong-chol) who slept through dictator Kim Jong Un’s speech brings 
North Korea’s brutal death-penalty count to at least 70 since he took power in 2011 and 
Kim has been accused of ordering the executions of as many as 15 top officials so far this 
year.”106 It seems that Kim Jong Un is continually trying to shore up his power and 
eliminate any threats to his leadership he may perceive at all costs. 
The image of an ambivalent North Korean regime is heightened by the fact that 
what is known of its leader’s life history is rather obscure and this further exacerbates this 











Switzerland under an assumed name and loves basketball. This is evident in his invitation 
to and hosting of former NBA player Dennis Rodman where he has been photographed 
with a big smile on his face with Rodman. On the other side is the leader of one of the 
poorest nations on the planet that spends the majority of its capital on its military and 
makes numerous threats to its neighbors and the United States. In numerous press photos, 
Kim Jong Un can be seen smiling with a cigarette gripped in his left hand, which to some 
Western observers makes him appear cavalier and actually not threatening. However, his 
actions illustrate a man who is capable of being very dangerous and this is one of the 
main reasons the neighboring states are worried because of the arsenal behind the throne. 
His ambivalent nature may be explained by the dynamic of Kim Jong Un’s inexperience 
and also his insecurity. The ambivalence of the regime is noted by Madeleine Albright in 
her memoir when she relates a distinct trait of the North Koreans who were “unused to 
consulting with a democracy, they had the habit of doing nothing for months, then 
making a decision and expecting an immediate response.”107 Therefore, a regime that has 
a reputation for being opaque and unpredictable and takes however long to respond to an 
inquiry makes it quite challenging to predict what their reply might be in any given 
situation. 
Another aspect of the North Korean regime under Kim Jong Un that must be 
explored is the need to create an enemy as an excuse to hold onto power, even as many of 
the North Korean people are starving. Kim Jong Un commands one of the largest 
militaries in the world, many of which are forward deployed near the DMZ. If he does 






Korea, then the problems of the nation cannot be blamed on others. Scott Snyder states 
that “The North Korean regime thrives on crisis and gains international support from 
crisis situations; for this reason, the regime mobilizes its people in a state of seemingly 
perpetual crisis.”108 If there is a stated and apparent strong enemy threat, this military first 
defensive and offensive posture can be more readily justified. Dr. Stephen Noerper of the 
Korea Society has stated that “Increasingly, South Korea wants to see some forward 
progress on inter-Korean relations but the North Koreans use the problems with the U.S. 
as an excuse for not moving forward in that area.” 109  North Korea also frequently 
criticizes South Korea such as referring to it as a ‘puppet regime’ of the United States. 
Recent revelations in May 2015 relate how “the North’s official Korean Central News 
Agency lashed out at (President) Park over her comments on the reported execution of 
North Korea’s defense minister, calling the South Korean leader a ‘reckless viper’” and 
stating that “She is making a flurry of reckless remarks to escalate confrontation.”110 




One type of engagement that has not been highlighted in this research is unilateral 











in world affairs. American unilateral action in 2003 in Iraq is one example that comes to 
mind when our policy had detrimental consequences. On the other hand, unilateral action 
can be positive and a clear example is when the United States can help deescalate a 
situation by offering a level-head especially in times of crisis, such as being in constant 
communication with the South Koreans when the Cheonan was sunk and the 
Yeongpyong Islands were shelled. In both instances, the United States helped deescalate 
the situation by being there for support and to offer prudent advice to the South Koreans.  
Unilateral action can prove to be imprudent at times and one example was the 
American decision to introduce nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula in the late 
1950s that escalated tensions in the region. However, the climate on the peninsula and in 
the region was deescalated decades later in 1991, “when President George H.W. Bush 
unilaterally decided to withdraw all remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Korea and 
to remove all nuclear weapons from the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet.111 The implications of 
these nuclear weapons is rather alarming because they must have been incorporated into 
American war planning and therefore heighten any conflict by the risk of their use.  
Another more recent example occurred in the first day of the Obama administration in 
2009, when someone from Secretary of State Clinton’s office requested approval for a 
draft of a message that would be read by her to the North Korean people basically 
reiterating the former President Bush’s North Korean policies in the twilight of his 







policy.”112 Senior Director for East Asian Affairs Jeffrey Bader responded to this request 
stating “The new President and the new national security team deserved a chance to 
consider the direction we were going in before the bureaucracy attempted to tie us to 
existing processes and policies” and “that we would not communicate with the North 
Koreans without first coordinating with Seoul, Tokyo, and ideally with Beijing and 
Moscow.”113 Mr. Bader is basically reiterating the U.S. policy of multilateral engagement 
and I do believe working with our partners and neighbors in the region gives us a stronger 
hand and also leads to less chance of conflict or misunderstanding. In addition, it takes 
vigilance by our foreign policymakers to take a step back sometimes and think about the 
implications of a press release or oral statement from a high level official such as the 
Secretary of State. When that message is directed at another state’s citizenry, then there 
should be even more caution. Lastly, in today’s globalized world, the United States 
should be consulting with its partners on the majority of issues. 
With North Korea and the aspect of integration, the implications of ‘going it 
alone’ for the United States would be daunting. This is another reason why a multilateral 
approach is sensible. Dr. Noerper of the Korea Society states “I think the U.S. has neither 
the will nor the financial means to go it alone, so probably either under a UN cap, or a 
UN cap that’s notionally run by South Korea and the integration process will tend to 












Director-General for National Security and Unification Studies at South Korea’s 
Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security Jun Bong-Geun has stated, “Since 
1991, Washington and Seoul have generally pursued four schools of thought and 
approaches to the North Korean nuclear issue: collapse, non-engagement, negotiation, 
and sunshine.”115 The latter two provide the most practical and forward-thinking options. 
The collapse of North Korea has been predicted for decades and has not come to pass. 
Believing it is imminent has unfortunately produced inaction and illustrated a surprising 
naivety of US foreign policymakers. Also, it has been noted that some policy thinkers 
believe that certain US action can help this collapse occur. Selig Harrison spoke of this in 
1994 “in a revealing exchange with a retired senior US diplomat who argued that instead 
of propping it up by extending economic help and normalizing relations, Washington, 
Seoul and Tokyo should pursue policies of pressure and isolation to hasten its demise.”116 
While Mr. Harrison was speaking of offering more incentives or carrots to North Korea, 
this diplomat was focused on a realist approach through a hard line policy.  Such a tough 
stance could push North Korea over the edge and lead to a grave misunderstanding and 
perhaps even war if North Korea feels cornered and desperate enough. A war is the worst 










“immense destruction and lead to an untold number of deaths of South Korean, North 
Korean, and U.S. personnel.”117 
The collapse of North Korea has been predicted for decades and the nation has 
illustrated a resiliency that has surprised many doomsayers. Even when there was mass-
starvation and death in the 1990s, the regime held on to power. The leadership and 
military get the lion’s share of resources and this combined with their grip on power by 
force basically ensure regime survival. There is also the risk that thinking North Korea 
will collapse may translate into a lack of diplomatic efforts. I contend that this is one of 
the reasons for American ambivalence because policymakers believed the DPRK was on 
the brink of ruin and therefore dealing with them was not necessary and therefore 
practiced a policy of non-engagement. However, the possibility of the DPRK collapsing 
or a sudden regime change should concern the United States and its allies. Dr. Noerper of 
the Korea Society asks “What if things happen quickly and spiral out of control?”118 He 
elaborates by stating that “What concerns me is neither the United States or the 
international community has coordinated its contingency planning and dialogue to the 
extent that they need to.”119 There should be a frank discussion of the entire spectrum of 
possibilities one can conceive so that the U.S. and the world community are better 
prepared to deal with such a scenario. The need for an in-depth coordinated policy should 









Another aspect of non-engagement is that such a practice appears to aggravate the 
DPRK and they often take certain actions in what appears to be an attempt to refocus 
attention on them. Some of these actions have been tragic, such as the torpedo attack of 
the Cheonan (which the DPRK denies) or the shelling of Yongpyeong Island. It seems 
that they are looking for a reaction from the U.S. and/or South Korea and realize that 
ultimately neither nation will risk starting a devastating war. This in turn gives the DPRK 
not only leeway in its actions but also leverage against other states like the U.S. and 
South Korea. It is difficult to argue that this action was not an act of war and although 
they vehemently deny it, the evidence points to the DPRK. However, once again the 
North Koreans believe that South Korea and the United States will hold off on starting a 
major conflict at nearly all costs. This begs the question “Where does South Korea and 
the United States draw a line in the sand?” This is a query beyond the purview of this 
research but the short answer I believe is that short of a direct attack that causes a serious 
loss of life that can be traced unquestionably back to the DPRK, the U.S., South Korea 
and its allies will have to hold off any major counterattacks because they could escalate 
into a disastrous full-fledged conflict. 
Sincere negotiation and sunshine are closely related and the late South Korean 
President Kim Dae Jung is credited with implementing the sunshine policy. One of the 
major successes of this policy was a summit between the two presidents, which was a 
clear example of diplomacy in action. The sunshine policy relies heavily on mediation 
and looks at the Korean peninsula as a fraternal country divided by a chaotic and tragic 
event. During the time of Kim Dae Jung’s sunshine policy, then Secretary of State 




hope to future discussions between the two countries and suggests that maybe through 
mutual respect and frank conversation these talks could possibly bear fruit. Secretary 
Albright said something quite powerful that gives us an important glimpse into what Kim 
Jong Il wanted; “Above all, normal relations with the United States; that would shield his 
country from the threat he saw posed by American power and help him to be taken 
seriously in the eyes of the world.”120 Another poignant statement by Kim during their 
meeting was “If both sides are genuine and serious, there is nothing we will not be able to 
do.”121 Both of these statements by the Kim Jong Il speak volumes of the potential for 
progress with the United States leading the way to move the peace process forward. 
Additionally, it lays bare how North Korea sees the United States as not only a nation 
with great power but also reveals how bilateral engagement can be used as leverage 
because this is one of North Korea’s ultimate foreign policy goals. It is worth noting that 
before returning to the United States, Madeleine Albright stopped in Seoul to confer with 
President Kim Dae Jung and the Japanese foreign minister.122 While the United States 
must always consult with its partners in the region, especially these two main allies, 
statements like the ones Kim Jong Il had made do offer hope that bilateral engagement 
might bear fruit. However, his son seems to take a different view than his father with 
continual provocation, saber rattling and doubling down on their constitution being 
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about survival at all costs. The situation is not ripe for one-on-one engagement and 
therefore the chances of a bilateral meeting between the U.S. Secretary of State and the 
leader of North Korea does not appear to be likely any time soon under the current 
climate. Furthermore, the normalization of relations appears to be even more remote in 
the near future.  
As alluded to earlier in my research, I believe that the United States has been 
ambivalent in its foreign policy with North Korea. However, it has recently tended to 
utilize a multilateral approach and the reasoning behind this can be found in a mix of 
domestic and international considerations. The first consideration is that the United States 
feels that this is the best alternative in the current climate. Isolation is not a policy of the 
modern era and therefore multilateral engagement is the most sensible option. The second 
is that the United States most likely has a stronger hand when coming to the table if 
appearing to be on the same page as the other powers in the Six-Party Talks, especially 
the DPRK’s historical allies China and Russia. As an equal partner, the United States 
illustrates its respect for the other parties and shows that it is a reasonable actor. The third 
is that if the United States is viewed as working with the other powers including having a 
serious conversation with the DPRK, it most likely saves face because it appears to be a 
team player. The other regional players, especially China and Russia, want the United 
States to communicate with North Korea. A fourth reason is that the U.S. feels like it has 
no choice because of the current climate and therefore must pursue multilateral 








not sensible. Also, there are many states in the region and it is difficult to deal with just 
one or two. A fifth reason is domestic considerations as a probable reason for both 
American multilateralism and at times ambivalence. The majority of the citizenry would 
most likely want the United States to work cooperatively with other nations, promoting 
peace, freedom and economic prosperity. However, at other times there are some citizens 
who prefer that the United States disengage or take certain actions that may upset the 
status quo and also make the U.S. appear ambivalent. In the case of North Korea, more 
conservative hardliners in the U.S. feel a certain animosity towards the DPRK. Very 
interestingly, in the bilateral one-on-one discussion between Madeleine Albright and Kim 
Jong Il, he had said that: 
There was a fifty-fifty split within his military on whether or not to 
improve relations with the United States and that there were people in the 
foreign ministry who had opposed even his decision to talk to us. As in the 
U.S., there are people here with views different from mine, although they 
don’t amount to the level of opposition you have.124 
This illustrates a leader who was adeptly aware of the perception among a certain 
contingent in the U.S. who were against dealing with the DPRK on nearly any level. 
Ultimately, I’d like to propose that the United States continue on the multilateral 
track but keep open the door to bilateral negotiations. We live in a multipolar globalized 
world where no nation should favor unilateralism. Negotiation under the auspices of the 
Six-Party talks offers a promising option for US foreign policy. Continual discussions at 






solutions on the North Korean challenge. Multilateralism is emerging as the US’s 
foremost tool in diplomacy in the modern era and the Six-Party talks and U.N. Security 
Council discussions are a clear display of this. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated 
in Seoul on April 10, 2015 “Everything we do in the Asia-Pacific region is done with our 
strong network of allies” and “the biggest part of the rebalance (to Asia) is our continued 
work with our colleagues and our security alliances and partnerships.”125 However, as Dr. 
Stephen Noerper stated, “We (the United States and its partners) have to be more creative 
in approaching the North Korean challenge.”126 What this creativity translates into may 
include serious discussions with “those entities talking about solutions for unification and 
given South Korea’s emphasis on utilizing mid-level diplomacy, a look at how other mid-
level powers come into play such as Canada, Australia and others who can be very useful 
to Korea on agriculture, energy and confidence building.”127 
One of my final thoughts in this research is that I feel compelled to mention an 
astute statement by Lt. Col. Rosa about force and diplomacy. Close to the end of our 
conversation, he stated that “The military should always be the weapon of last resort and 
we should try to give diplomacy a shot every day, day in and day out. Force should 
always be the last option.”128 Lt. Col. Rosa also stated that “Every Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs will say that we are just one part of the foreign policy strategy and that in the 











Economics).”129 Basically, these are main aspects of the foreign policy mindset and the 
military is always the last one that is utilized. An economic example might be an 
embargo while information can be what intelligence is out there. Diplomacy is an integral 
part of this DIME paradigm and it was very interesting to learn of this strategy from a 
seasoned military officer. 
“Dreams of Asia rising must pay respect to a strategic reality centered on the 
United States as the underwriter of regional security.”130In other words, the United States 
helps play the integral role of promoting peace and stabilization in Asia. I think the 
United States is indeed a “Pacific Power” as President Obama has stated and that the U.S. 
is “leading to promote shared security and shared economic growth this century, just as 
the U.S. did in the last.”131 As Kofi Annan said in his final speech as Secretary General of 
the United Nations, “None of our global institutions can accomplish much when the US 
remains aloof; but when it is fully engaged, the sky is the limit.”132 Such a poignant 
statement gives hope for the future and illustrates how the United States must continue to 
be engaged in one of the most important security issues in East Asia and beyond. The 
urgency of a growing nuclear North Korea and one that is increasingly provocative is a 
situation that the United States must face and be ready to utilize the different tools in its 














partners in the region. The United States must be clear that it is pursuing a policy of 
multilateral engagement with both its allies and historic foes. This will reassure 
America’s allies and illustrate to the global community that the U.S. is a partner for peace 
and security. As June of this year marked the 65th Anniversary of the start of the 
destructive and tragic Korean War, diplomacy must be an enduring priority. A peaceful 
solution to the heavily militarized divided Korean peninsula may be the most important 





































Albright, David and O’Neill, Kevin. Solving the North Korean Puzzle. Washington, DC:  
Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2000, 2, 46, 302 
 
Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary. New York: Miramax Books, 2003, 435, 459- 
460, 463, 465, 467 
 
Allison, Graham. Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats, Foreign Affairs, 89 no.  
1, 2010, 75 
 
Avni, Benny. Nuke-Deal Pitfalls: Licensing an Iranian Bomb,” New York Post,  
November 24, 2014. 
http://nypost.com/2014/11/23/nuke-deal-pitfalls-licensing-an-iranian-bomb/ 
 
Bader, Jeffrey A. Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia  
Strategy, Brookings Institution Press, 2012, Pages 27, 29-30, 34, 36-38 
 




Bong-Geun, Jun. North Korean Crises: An End in Sight? Arms Control Today, Vol. 36.  
No. 1 (January/February 2006), 7 
 
Cha, Victor D. and Kang, David C. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement  
Strategies. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, 45, 121 
 
Crail, Peter. Outreach to North Korea Continues. Arms Control Today, Vol. 40. No. 2  
(March 2010), 53  
 
Davies, Glyn. “U.S. Policy Towards North Korea by  Glyn Davies Special  
Representative for North Korea Policy,” U.S. Department of State, July 30, 2014 
 http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/07/229936.htm 
 
Evans, Stephen. North Korea Defence Chief Hyon Yong-chol Executed, BBC News, May  
12, 2015  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32716749 
 









Gallucci, Robert; Poneman, Daniel; Wit, Joel S. Seven Lessons for Dealing With Today’s  
North Korea Nuclear Crisis. Arms Control Today, Vol. 34, No. 3 (April 2004) 20 
 
Gates, Robert M. Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security  
Assistance, Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3, 2010, 6 
 
Gilmore, Gerry J. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ Speech Put Iraq on Notice, American Forces  
Press Service, US Department of Defense, March 18, 2005 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31166 
 
Greene, Leonard, Kim Jong Un Sends Brutal Message with Grisly Executions, NY Post,  




Han, Sang Mi. North Korea Criticized for Rants Against South Korean President.” Voice  




Harrison, Selig S. Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.  
Disengagement. Princeton University Press, 2009, 18, 172 
 
Harrison, Selig S. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: From Stalemate to Breakthrough.  
Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 9, NE Asia Special Issue (November 1994), 18 
 
Holguin, Jaime. A Rare Glimpse Inside Bush’s Cabinet: As He Speaks Frankly About  
Early Days of War on Terror, CBS News – 60 Minutes, November 17, 2002 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-rare-glimpse-inside-bushs-cabinet/ 
 
Joffe, Josef. The Default Power: The False Prophecy of American Decline, Foreign  
Affairs 88, no. 5, 2009, 35 
 
Joint Press Conference with Secretary Carter and Defense Minister Han in Seoul,  
April 10, 2015 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5618 
 




Lee, Hong Yung. North Korea in 2013: Economy, Executions, and Nuclear  
Brinkmanship. Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 2013 –  





Luck, Edward C. Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization –  
1919-1999. Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 1999, xiii, 3-4, 7, 19, 
20, 24, 280  
 








Page, Jeremy and Solomon, Jay. China Warns North Korean Nuclear Threat is Rising:  
Pyongyang Could Double Nuclear Weapons Arsenal by Next Year, According to 




Patrick, Stewart and Forman, Shepard. Multilateralism & U.S. Foreign Policy:  
Ambivalent Engagement. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.,  
2002, 1-2, 10, 12, 25, 28, 32, 38, 121, 123 
 





Pollack, Jonathan D. No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International  





Remarks by President Obama at APEC CEO Summit. The White House, Office of the  




Rice, Susan. “Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations, at the Security Council Stakeout,” United States Mission to 
the United Nations, February 12, 2013 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/204033.htm 
 




the United Nations, at a Security Council Meeting on the Situation on the Korean 
Peninsula,” United States Mission to the United Nations, December 19, 2010 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/153128.htm 
 
Scissors, Derek. Deng Undone: The Costs of Halting Market Reform in China, Foreign  
Affairs 88, no. 3, 2009, 45 
 
Sigal, Leon V. “Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton,  
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998, Preface, 3, 9, 12, 34 
 
Snyder, Scott A. U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, SERI Quarterly, Council on Foreign  
Relations, January 2013 
http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/us-policy-toward-north-korea/p29962 
 
Watson, Leon. We ARE A Nuclear Power: North Korea’s Chilling Claim in New  




Interview with Dr. Stephen Noerper, Senior Vice President at the Korea Society, by Alex  
Guarino in New York on May 7, 2015 
 
Interview with Guillermo Rosa, U. S. Army Lieutenant Colonel (retired) and former  
Deputy Military Advisor to Ambassador Susan Rice at the U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations, by Alex Guarino in New York on May 18, 2015 
 
Interview with Ana Escrogima, Diplomat in Residence at the City College of New York,  
by Alex Guarino in New York on May 20, 2015 
